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Abstract: Can a WTO Member discriminate against foreign suppliers of services
located in jurisdictions that refuse to share information with a government to
permit it to determine if its nationals engage in tax evasion? Does it matter if the
Member uses standards developed by an international body as the criterion for
deciding whether to impose measures? In Argentina–Financial Services, the WTO
Appellate Body held that services from jurisdictions that share financial tax
information may be different from services provided by jurisdictions that do not
cooperate in supplying such information. It overruled a Panel finding that
measures to increase taxes on financial transactions with non-cooperative
jurisdictions were discriminatory. We argue that the AB reached the right
conclusion on the basis of the wrong arguments; that it missed an important
opportunity to clarify what WTO Members are permitted to do to enforce their
domestic regulatory regimes; and increased the scope for confusion and future
litigation by considering that the likeness of services and service suppliers may be
a function of prevailing domestic regulatory regimes.
1. Introduction
Argentina–Financial Services1 was the first financial services-related dispute to be
brought to the WTO Appellate Body (AB) and the first in which the GATS
carve-out for prudential regulation was invoked.2 It is a rather distinctive case in
* Email: p.delimatsis@uvt.nl.
** Email: bernard.hoekman@eui.eu.
We are grateful to our discussant, Rob Howse, and participants in the EUI workshop ‘WTO Case-Law
of 2016’ on 14–15 June 2017 for helpful comments and suggestions. Remaining errors and misconceptions
are the authors’ alone.
1 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services (Argentina–
Financial Services), WT/DS453/AB/R, adopted 9 May 2016.
2 The Panel Report on a previous financial services-related dispute, China–Electronic Payment Services
was not appealed. See Hoekman and Meagher (2014) on that dispute.
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that the dispute centred on measures taken by the Argentine government to combat
tax evasion by nationals of Argentina. The Argentine economy has been character-
ized by recurring macroeconomic crises and weak economic governance. Following
excessive spending and unsustainable fiscal deficits, Argentina defaulted on some
US$91 billion in external debt in 2001, which led to a complicated and drawn
out process of debt restructuring over the subsequent decade. During this period,
the economy was effectively cut off from international capital markets.
Argentina was only able to borrow internationally again in 2016. The balance of
payments crisis motivated a variety of policies to control imports and retain
foreign exchange, including formal and informal measures to limit foreign currency
purchases for savings and investment abroad. The use of export taxes was
expanded – rising to 15.5% of the value of total exports in 2012 (USTR, 2013).
Stringent restrictions on imports were imposed, including extensive import licens-
ing and policies requiring importers to balance what they brought into the country
with an equivalent value of exports and foreign exchange.
The share of the public sector in total expenditures rose rapidly in the period per-
tinent to this dispute. General government primary spending increased from 26%
to 39% of GDP between 2007 and 2015, with much of the increase going towards
public sector wages, pensions, and subsidy programs. Government revenues also
grew, from 28% to 34% of GDP during this period, with the tax burden rising
to a quarter of GDP, one of the highest ratios in Latin America (IMF, 2016).
The combination of a relatively large public sector, major fiscal deficits, lack of
access to global capital markets and associated capital controls, inflationary
financing of deficits, and efforts to raise tax revenues, all combined to create incen-
tives for capital flight and tax evasion.3 Policy efforts to control capital flight and
tax evasion were not very successful. Most Argentine taxpayers evade taxes –
85% of respondents to surveys admit to evading some taxes, with half of respon-
dents indicating they evade at least 20% of what is due. The collection rate for
income tax due is below 50% (Bergman, 2009). This is despite substantial collec-
tion efforts by the tax administration – e.g., Argentina spends more than three
times per unit of tax revenue collected than neighbouring Chile (Gómez-Sabaini
and Jiménez, 2012).
In the dispute, Panama contested measures imposed by Argentina that penalized
bilateral financial flows, justified on the basis that Panama was a ‘non-cooperating’
country because it did not exchange information with the Argentine tax adminis-
tration. The measures comprised additional taxes on interest, dividends, and
profits on transactions involving financial service suppliers based in Panama and
restrictions on access to Argentine financial markets.
3 Such incentives predated the crisis period: the tax burden rose 68% between the early 1990s and
2009.
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Panama is an offshore financial centre used by Argentine nationals, but is just
one of many destinations for Argentine funds.4 One estimate of the magnitude of
funds held offshore by Argentine nationals in 2015 was US$210 billion, as com-
pared to US$30 billion declared to the tax authorities. Much of these funds are
deposited in high-income countries, including the United States, Luxembourg,
Italy, and the UK. Together these four destinations account for over 80% of
Argentine foreign portfolio assets (IMF, 2016).
The dispute arose during a period in which a concerted effort was being made at
the global level to combat money laundering and tax evasion through international
transparency and comity mechanisms. Both Argentina and Panama were part of
this process and both referenced the international standards of tax transparency
that had been agreed among participating countries. The dispute is therefore of
more general salience for the WTO because it raises issues regarding the WTO/
GATS compatibility of domestic measures if these are based on international stan-
dards. It is also of interest in shedding light on the scope that exists for invoking the
general exceptions provision of the GATS (Art. XIV) as a justification for action
against foreign services or service suppliers when this is deemed necessary for enfor-
cing domestic regulation. Argentina invoked Art. XIV as a defence for its measures
against Panama, arguing its measures were necessary to achieve a legitimate regu-
latory objective.
The Panel found the Argentine measures violated MFN and, because of this,
could not be justified under GATS Art. XIV. It also ruled against a prudential regu-
lation defence for some of the measures as it held they were not of a prudential
nature. The AB overturned the Panel finding that the measures violated MFN,
agreed with the Panel on its reasoning as regards Art. XIV, and rejected an
appeal by Panama regarding the Panel’s finding on the scope of measures falling
under a prudential regulation defence. The upshot was that the Argentine measures
were not found to violate its WTO commitments.
We will argue in what follows that the way the AB dealt with this case constitutes
a missed opportunity to clarify three issues of central importance for the trading
system: (i) determining the ‘likeness’ of services and service suppliers originating
(based) in different jurisdictions; (ii) establishing the function of Art. XIV in
matters pertaining to the enforcement of domestic law and regulations on national
persons (natural or legal); and (iii) clarifying the role that internationally agreed
good regulatory practices may play in justifying the use of services trade policies.
4 The unprecedented leak of over 11 million confidential documents from the Panamanian law firm
Mossack Fonseca greatly raised the public profile of Panama as an offshore financial centre and tax
haven – see, e.g., www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/03/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-panama-
papers (accessed 12 June 2017). Research suggests however that as far as financial flows are concerned,
Panama is a relatively small player in this domain. Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2017) note that Panama is
mainly a tax haven for individuals as it has relatively high corporate taxes (25%) and that it is essentially
a small ‘conduit’ type haven –most of the shell companies revealed in the Mossack Fonseca data leak were
domiciled in the British Virgin Islands.
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Both the Panel and AB focused predominantly on the question of likeness and
neglected the salience of Art. XIV in this case, given that the measures targeted
Argentine tax nationals that sought to evade Argentine law, not foreign suppliers
of services. An overemphasis on ‘likeness’ and the applicability of GATT case
law confused rather than clarified matters, as the issues arising in this case were
quite different from those that tend to characterize ‘standard’ GATT cases.
The plan of the article is as follows. In Section 2, we briefly discuss ongoing
international cooperation efforts to establish agreed standards and criteria on
good practices in the area of exchange of information on tax matters between
jurisdictions. Section 3 summarizes the measures that were at issue in the
dispute. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the Panel and AB findings. Section 6 steps
back and provides a critique of the AB’s reasoning and suggests an alternative
approach that we believe would have better served the WTO membership.
Section 7 concludes.
2. International standards on transparency and exchange of tax information
As the recommendations of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of
Information for Tax Purposes and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) play a
role in this dispute, we start with a brief discussion of these initiatives. The
Global Forum was created in 2000 by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) with a view to establishing high stan-
dards of transparency and exchange of information on tax matters. It comple-
mented a contemporaneous Harmful Tax Competition initiative (OECD, 1998,
2000) that targeted the operation of tax havens and promoted exchange of infor-
mation between tax administrations. The Global Forum was revitalized in 2009
following increased pressure at the G-20 level to do more to discipline tax havens
(OECD, 2009), becoming the main multilateral forum where work on transpar-
ency and exchange of information takes place, including through the promulga-
tion and implementation of voluntary standards (Hakelberg, 2016). It currently
comprises 148 members. Two key standards adopted by the Forum concern
the automatic exchange of information (AEOI) and the exchange of information
on request (EOIR). Implementation of these standards is monitored through a
public peer review process and periodic reports by the OECD secretariat
(OECD, 2016).
Initially conceived as a global initiative to address money laundering, the FATF
was created in 1989 by the G-7 (Freis, 2010). In a short period, the FATF adopted
some forty Recommendations aimed at combating the misuse of financial systems
by persons laundering drug money. The FATF subsequently updated its
Recommendations to cover money laundering unrelated to drugs. In the aftermath
of 9/11, FATF also adopted nine special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.
In 2003 and 2012, the FATF revised its 40+9 recommendations and adopted a set
of international standards for anti-money laundering and countering the financing
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of terrorism (AML/CFT).5 The recommendations constitute a non-binding instru-
ment under international law but have been endorsed by over 180 countries. The
FATF monitors the implementation of the recommendations, and members are
assessed through a mutual evaluation (peer-review) process. The Financial
Stability Board (FSB) recognizes the FATF recommendations as key components
of sound financial systems in the field of institutional and market infrastructure.6
The FATF has no legal personality. It is not an international organization. It has a
temporary mandate, which is regularly renewed.7 At the time of writing, the FATF
comprises thirty-seven members, of which twenty-one are non-EU countries (includ-
ing US, India, China, and Russia) or regional organizations. Not all EU member
States are FATF members, but the European Commission, the EU’s executive
body and one of the leading forces in setting up the FATF, is a member. Argentina
is a member of the FATF (it is also a G20 member), whereas Panama is not.
The FATF has a relatively rigorous process of identifying high-risk and non-
cooperative jurisdictions. Assessments by the International Cooperation Review
Group (ICRG) are used to identify jurisdictions that have strategic AML/CFT defic-
iencies. Panama was subject to the FATF monitoring process until February 2016,
at which point it was deemed to have become compliant.8 Thus, when WTO con-
sultations were requested by Panama at the end of 2012 and at the time of the
establishment of the Panel in 2013, Panama was still considered a high-risk juris-
diction by the FATF. Argentina ceased to be subject to the FATF’s AML/CFT com-
pliance process in October 2014, several months after the initiation of the dispute.
3. The measures at issue
Panama challenged eight measures (Table 1). Four relate to taxation (measures 1–
4). The remaining measures concerned access by foreign suppliers to segments of
the Argentine financial markets: the reinsurance sector (measure 5), the capital
market (measure 6), registration of branches of foreign companies (measure 7),
and access to foreign exchange (measure 8). To give a flavour of the tax-related
policies, Measure 1 pertains to payments made to creditors in non-cooperative
countries for credits, loans, or the placement of funds in a foreign location. If the
country to which payments are being made is deemed cooperative, a capital
gains tax of 35% is imposed on 43% of the amount transferred. If the country is
5 See: www.fatf-gafi.org/recommendations.html. These Recommendations were later updated in 2013,
2015 and, more recently, in October 2016.
6 See: www.fsb.org/what-we-do/about-the-compendium-of-standards/key_standards/ (accessed 1 June
2017).
7 The current mandate covers the period 2012–2020. See www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
FINAL%20FATF%20MANDATE%202012-2020.pdf (visited 1 June 2017).
8 See FATF, ‘Improving Global AML/CFT Compiance: On-Going Process’, 19 February 2016, www.
fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/fatf-compliance-june-2017.
html.
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not cooperative, the tax imposed is 35% of the total amount transferred – i.e., the
total value of the financial flow is considered to be profit (a capital gain). Measure 2
pertains to financial inflows, with a presumption that inflows from non-cooperative
countries constitute capital gains; Measure 3 presumes that transactions with non-
cooperative countries are between related parties and are affected by transfer
pricing manipulation; while Measure 4 addresses the allocation of expenditures
with a view to prevent underreporting of profits. All four measures essentially
have to do with provisions that increase the base for capital gains (profit or
income) taxation for flows involving non-cooperative jurisdictions. The other
four measures essentially raise the cost or prohibit access to the Argentine
financial markets for firms from non-cooperative jurisdictions.
Panama argued before the Panel that, by classifying Panama as a non-coopera-
tive country, all eight measures violated the MFN obligation (Article II GATS).
For measures 2, 3, and 4, Panama also claimed a violation of national treatment
(NT) commitments (Article XVII GATS). Argentina invoked the general exception
provision of Article XIV GATS to defend all measures, except for its measures relat-
ing to the reinsurance market and access to the Argentine capital market, for which
it invoked the prudential regulation carve-out (paragraph 2(a) of the GATS
Financial Services Annex).
The key criterion in the application of the measures used by Argentina, defined in
Decree No. 589/2013 (hereinafter ‘the Decree’), was whether entities providing
Table 1. Measures challenged by Panama
Measure
No. Description
1 Tax treatment in the collection of gains tax on certain transactions involving non-
cooperative countries (hereinafter withholding tax on payments of interest or
remuneration)
2 Tax treatment imposed on entry of funds from non-cooperative countries (hereinafter
presumption of unjustified increase in wealth)
3 Valuation of transactions with persons from non-cooperative countries (hereinafter trans-
action valuation based on transfer prices)
4 Criteria for applying deductions (hereinafter payment received rule for the allocation of
expenditure)
5 Measures affecting trade in reinsurance and retrocession services (hereinafter requirements
relating to reinsurance services)
6 Measures affecting trade in financial instruments (hereinafter requirements for access to the
Argentine capital market)
7 Requirements for the registration of companies, branches and shareholders of certain
foreign service suppliers (hereinafter requirements for the registration of branches)
8 Measures affecting the repatriation of investments (hereinafter foreign exchange author-
ization requirement)
Source: Panel Report, Argentina–Financial Services, para. 2.9.
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financial services were based in ‘cooperative’ or ‘non-cooperative’ countries for tax
transparency purposes. According to the Decree, a ‘cooperative’ status is granted to
those jurisdictions that: (a) have concluded an agreement with Argentina on
exchange of tax information or a double taxation avoidance agreement with an
information exchange clause (provided that such exchange is effective); or (b)
agree to negotiate such agreements.
Crucially, Argentina classified Panama as a cooperative economy as of January
2014, immediately following the establishment of the Panel in November 2013.
This ‘upgrade’ in status occurred even though none of the conditions laid down
in the Decree was met and no agreement for effective exchange of tax-related infor-
mation had been agreed upon.9 The result of this decision was to blur the distinc-
tion between cooperative and non-cooperative jurisdictions that is the key criterion
in the Decree. It led the Panel to conclude that Argentina granted cooperative status
to economies (such as Panama) with which no effective exchange of tax informa-
tion occurred and thus that there was discrimination against services and service
suppliers of non-cooperative countries.
4. The Panel findings
In assessing Panama’s claim that all eight measures were inconsistent with theMFN
rule, the Panel found that the difference in treatment between cooperative and non-
cooperative countries is due to origin. In this respect, the Panel underlined the
Argentine failure to prove that factors, other than origin, such as the exchange
of tax information affected the competitive relationship between services and
service suppliers of cooperative and non-cooperative countries (for instance, by
showing how such factors influence the characteristics of the service and consu-
mers’ preferences).
The Panel found that inconsistencies in the way that Argentina designated and
treated different cooperative and non-cooperative countries made it impossible to
evaluate potentially relevant ‘other factor(s)’ in addition to their origin that
might impact on assessing the likeness of services and service suppliers from differ-
ent home countries (p. 74). As a result, all eight measures were deemed to violate
MFN (Article II:1 GATS) because services and service suppliers of non-cooperative
countries do not benefit immediately and unconditionally from treatment no less
favourable than that which services and service suppliers of cooperative countries
enjoy – and that differences in treatment were not based on whether Argentina had
access to tax information, because some countries treated as cooperative had not
agreed on mechanisms to exchange tax information.
9 Panama denied to the Panel that the shift in status reflected a request on its part to launch negotiations
and it appears that no such discussion occurred during the period of the dispute. Panel Report, Argentina–
Financial Services, paras. 7.173, 7.291.
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Furthermore, with respect to measures 2 (a rebuttable presumption of unjustified
increase in wealth), 3 (an obligation to apply transaction valuation based on trans-
fer pricing rules), and 4 (a rule on the allocation of expenditures (costs) for transac-
tions between Argentine taxpayers and persons of non-cooperative countries), the
Panel found that Argentine services and service suppliers are like services and
service suppliers of non-cooperative countries. However, in the Panel’s view, the
Argentine measures were in line with the NT obligation set out in Article XVII
GATS, as they did not provide for more favourable treatment for Argentine services
and service suppliers relative to foreign ones. Rather, according to the Panel, these
three measures were designed to ensure that the competitive relationship among
services and service suppliers from cooperative and non-cooperative countries
was on equal footing. By finding so, the Panel emphasized the importance of measures
promoted by (consistent with) internationally agreed standards in addressing com-
petitive distortions – neutralizing an unintended competitive advantage enjoyed by
non-cooperative jurisdictions due to the lack of tax transparency (exchange of tax
information).10
Argentina sought to justify measures 1 (an irrefutable presumption of higher
capital gains taxes on payments of interest or remuneration), 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8 by
invoking the affirmative defence of Article XIV(c). The Panel noted that in order
for Argentina to successfully meet the legal standard of this subparagraph,
Argentina needed to show that the measures were designed to secure compliance
with relevant Argentine laws and regulations that are not in themselves inconsistent
with the GATS; and are necessary to secure such compliance. The Panel found that
Argentina met its burden of proof required for each measure. By making transac-
tions with a high risk of tax evasion subject to a higher tax base or subject to add-
itional information requirements or closer scrutiny, the measures at issue were
designed to achieve the objective of discouraging tax evasion/ensuring tax collec-
tion on all earnings obtained in Argentina.
However, it found that the measures failed to meet the strict standard of the
chapeau of Article XIV GATS because Argentina appeared to grant cooperative
status to countries with which it is negotiating a tax information exchange agree-
ment without however effectively gaining access to tax information by those coun-
tries. Thus, because the application of these measures appears to defy the objective
of the Argentine authorities to have effective access to tax information and blurs the
distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative jurisdictions, the Panel found
that the Argentine measures constituted arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
within the meaning of the chapeau of Article XIV GATS.11
The Panel went on to exercise judicial economy with respect to the Argentine
claim under Article XIV(d), as it was conditional on a finding of inconsistency of
10 Panel Report, Argentina–Financial Services, para. 7.521; also paras. 7.665ff.
11 Ibid, para. 7.761.
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measures 2, 3, and 4 with the NT obligation. As the Panel found no such inconsist-
ency, it refrained from discussing the application and scope of Article XIV(d),
which relates to the imposition and collection of direct taxes.
Finally, with respect to other GATS-related dimensions of the dispute, the Panel
had to rule on the Argentine claim that measures 5 and 6 (relating to requirements
for the supply of reinsurance services by suppliers of non-cooperative countries and
requirements for stock market intermediaries when engaging in transactions
ordered by persons of non-cooperative countries, respectively) can be justified by
paragraph 2(a) of the GATS Financial Services Annex. After finding that the mea-
sures at stake were measures affecting the supply of financial services, the Panel
examined whether these measures were taken for prudential reasons. In this
inquiry, the Panel found that Argentina failed to demonstrate that a rational rela-
tionship existed between the objectives pursued and the measures adopted. Based
on this finding, the Panel refrained from examining under the second sentence of
paragraph 2(a) whether, by promulgating these measures, Argentina wanted to
avoid its GATS commitments and obligations.
Panama also challenged measures 2 and 3, claiming that they are inconsistent
with the MFN obligation of Article 1.1 GATT. The Panel found that Panama
did not meet its burden of proof and thus rejected Panama’s claim. The Panel
also dismissed Panama’s alternative claim that measure 3 is covered by Article
XI GATT because it found that it was of a fiscal nature. Having rejected
Panama’s GATT-related claims, the Panel also denied to rule whether these mea-
sures are covered by Article XX(d) GATT.
5. The AB findings
The AB had to address essentially four claims brought by Argentina and Panama:
1. In regard to measures 1 to 8, whether the services and service suppliers from
cooperative and non-cooperative countries are ‘like’ within the meaning of
Article II:1 GATS (MFN).
2. With respect tomeasures2–4,whether theArgentine services and service suppliers are
‘like’ services and service suppliers of non-cooperative countries within the meaning
of Article XVII:1 GATS (brought by Argentina) and whether the Panel erred in
finding that less favourable treatment (LFT) did not occur (raised by Panama).
3. Whether Argentine measures 1–4, 7, and 8 were designed and necessary to secure
compliance with the relevant Argentine laws and regulations;
4. Whether measures 5 and 6 were covered by the prudential carve-out set out in
paragraph 2(a) of the GATS Financial Services Annex and, more broadly,
whether this carve-out covers all measures affecting the supply of financial services.
We discuss the AB reasoning regarding these four claims in what follows. In
Section 6, we argue that the approach taken to the likeness question is misconceived
and that the key issue here is item (c) under GATS Art. XIV.
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5.1 Likeness
The AB did not examine separately likeness under theMFN obligation and likeness
under the NT obligation. Confirming a degree of convergence in the determination
of likeness within and across WTO agreements, the AB analysed the criteria and
peculiarities of determining likeness of services and service suppliers at an abstract
level that spanned both MFN and NT. The AB also emphasized the connecting line
that transcends MFN and NT in both GATT and GATS, i.e., that they address dis-
criminatory measures and centre on the competitive relationship among services
and service suppliers or among products. This approach is sensible given the
absence of import tariffs on services, which diminishes the salience of services
product classifications and favours a criterion relating to competitive
relationships.12
The WTO case-law on likeness
It is established WTO case law that any criteria that could be used as proxies to
establish likeness are neither treaty-mandated nor listed in an exhaustive manner
in any one WTO legal provision.13 Indeed, the GATT and GATS texts are silent
on how likeness among two different products, services or service suppliers is to
be established. Since the Border Tax Adjustments (BAT) Working Party
Report,14 we know that four general criteria can guide the determination of like-
ness: physical characteristics (properties, nature, and quality); end-uses (describing
the possible functions of a product); consumer preferences (describing how consu-
mers appreciate these functions); and tariff classification. We also know that the
WTO adjudicating bodies, following GATT practice, give varying weight to the
four criteria depending on the GATT provision involved. In Japan–Alcoholic
Beverages, the AB noted that such discretion on the side of Panels is ‘unavoid-
able’.15 In Argentina–Financial Services, the AB confirmed this:16
As in the context of trade in goods, however, we equally consider that the criteria
for analysing ‘likeness’ of services and service suppliers are simply analytical tools
to assist in the task of examining the relevant evidence, and that they are neither a
treaty-mandated nor a closed list of criteria that will determine the legal charac-
terization of services and service suppliers as ‘like’.
12With regard to Art. XVII, see AB Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, paras. 244, 246.
13 See, among others, AB Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products (EC–Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, para. 102.
14Working Party Report, Border Tax Adjustments, L/3464, adopted 2 December 1970.
15 ABReport, Japan –Taxes onAlcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R,WT/DS10/AB/R,WT/DS11/AB/R,
adopted 1 November 1996, p. 20. See Mavroidis (2016) for an in-depth discussion.
16 AB Report, Argentina–Financial Services, para. 6.32.
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Broadly speaking, we know from WTO case law on likeness that:
(a) There is no closed list of criteria but the four criteria noted above more often
than not will give a strong indication whether Panels and the AB will judge
two products to be ‘like’.
(b) The four criteria are interrelated and not mutually exclusive, so that evidence
can be used for more than one criterion.17
(c) A determination on a case-by-case basis is warranted.
(d) A market-specific analysis of the competitive relationship between and among
products is required,18 which can mean that two products that are like in a
given market may not be like in another market.
(e) Regulatory concerns may play a role in determining likeness if they have an
impact on the competitive relationship between and among the products
concerned.
(f) A certain degree of convergence in interpreting the concept of likeness has
occurred in that the four likeness criteria, along with the concept of competitive
relationship, transcend the WTO agreements;19 Such convergence is observed
for both fiscal and non-fiscal measures falling under the various WTO agree-
ments, linking the concept of ‘likeness’ and ‘directly competitive or substitut-
able products’ through the overarching construct of ‘competitive
relationship’ (or the degree and extent of competition in the marketplace) or
competitiveness (Hudec, 2000).
(g) A close relationship exists between likeness and LFT, with the AB clarifying that
the latter informs the former, suggesting that likeness is about the nature and
extent of a competitive relationship between and among products.
Likeness of services and service suppliers
Establishing likeness in the services realm is more challenging than it is for goods.
For one, both MFN and NT require likeness of both services and service suppliers.
There is no requirement for a determination of like producers in the GATT. Service
17 See AB Reports, EC–Asbestos, para. 102; and Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits (Philippines–
Distilled Spirits), WT/DS396/AB/R, WT/DS403/AB/R, adopted 20 January 2012, para. 131, respectively.
18 See also AB Reports, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and
Marketing of Seal Products (EC–Seals), WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R, para. 5.82; and
Philippines–Distilled Spirits, para. 168.
19 See with respect to TBT, AB Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of
Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 April 2012, para. 120.
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suppliers are relevant in the GATS because trade in services includes establishment
by service suppliers and because service suppliers often (usually) are the focus of
regulation (as opposed to the specific services they provide). Physical characteristics
are not helpful for services because of their intangibility, thus removing one of the
GATT criteria for establishing likeness. Moreover, GATS makes no distinction
between like and directly competitive or substitutable products, or between taxes
and regulations, which implies that the consistency of measures affecting trade in
services with NT commitments in determinations of likeness need to be examined
in a flexible manner. This is even more so given that different modes of supply may
be used to contest a market and that these modes often are treated differently in
Members’ schedules of commitments under the GATS. The fact that NT is not
an unconditional obligation in the GATS but comprises specific commitments
through a positive listing or sectors combined with a negative listing of limitations
in schedules of commitments further complicates matters (Delimatsis, 2007).
In Argentina–Financial Services, the AB appeared to take issue with the EC–
Bananas III Panel finding that service suppliers providing like services are like.
Instead, the AB followed the reasoning of the China–Electronic Payment Services
Panel20 that in certain circumstances a determination of likeness for both services
and service suppliers is necessary before proceeding to discuss LFT. At the same
time, the AB underlined that no separate findings with regard to the likeness of ser-
vices and that of service suppliers is warranted: depending on the case, the relative
weight of one may prevail over the other. The AB noted that this flexible approach
is in line with the holistic analysis of likeness that it advocates.21
While the AB suggested that criteria for likeness developed in GATT case law
may be relevant as analytical tools, it limited its guidance on how these criteria
should be interpreted in the services realm to just one paragraph of its report.22
The AB started with the criterion of ‘characteristics’, which is reminiscent of the
first likeness criterion under GATT (physical properties, nature, and quality). It
also referred to the criterion of tariff classification suggesting that, under the
GATS, the UN central product classification (CPC) system can play a role similar
to the Harmonized System in GATT cases. Finally, it referred to the China–
Electronic Payment Services Panel to note that services-specific considerations
may require combinations of the different likeness criteria. After noting – correctly
in our view – the potential relevance of modes of supply for the determination of
likeness, the AB abruptly finished the discussion on criteria noting (with apparent
relief) that it was not called upon to reflect on the relevance and weight of the like-
ness criteria in this case.
20 Panel Report, China – Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services (China–Electronic
Payment Services), WT/DS413/R and Add.1, adopted 31 August 2012.
21 AB Report, Argentina–Financial Services, para. 6.29.
22 Ibid, para. 6.32.
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A final conceptual issue the AB dealt with under the rubric of likeness related to
the so-called ‘presumption’ of likeness.23 Established WTO case-law suggests that
a complainant, instead of discussing the four BAT criteria to establish likeness, can
alternatively establish that two products are like by demonstrating that the measure
at issue distinguishes between two products based exclusively on origin. If so, like-
ness should be presumed to exist and WTO Panels can proceed to the analysis of
LFT. The AB confirmed that such an approach is relevant for likeness in the case
of services, but warned of the complexities that such transposition entails due to
the characteristics of services mentioned earlier, which render more challenging
the evaluation of an origin-based distinction. The AB avoided any further statement
on the matter, noting that the nature, configuration, and operation of the measure
affects the application of the presumption approach.
The AB noted that the complainant bears the burden of demonstrating that an
origin-based distinction between services and service suppliers is drawn by the
regulating State. The respondent may rebut by showing that origin is not the exclu-
sive basis for the distinction drawn and/or that certain factors affect the four BAT
criteria for establishing likeness and thus have an impact on the competitive rela-
tionship between the services and service suppliers at issue. If successful, WTO
Panels are obliged to analyse all four likeness criteria before discussing whether
LFT is granted to foreign services and service suppliers.
‘Due to origin’ or ‘based exclusively’ on origin?
A key question for the ultimate outcome of the case was whether the Panel erred by
finding that the services and service suppliers at stake are like because the difference
in treatment is due to origin. The AB found that the Panel should have continued its
analysis because it was clear that it was not origin itself but the regulatory frame-
work linked to such origin (cooperative vs. non-cooperative jurisdictions) that
allowed for such distinctions and differences in treatment. The Panel had recog-
nized and considered this but concluded that the implementation by Argentina of
the criteria used to differentiate between cooperating and non-cooperating jurisdic-
tions was inconsistent, if not incoherent. The AB clarified that it understands the
presumption approach in a narrow sense to only cover origin-based distinctions.
It seems that the measures where such a presumption would be relevant would typ-
ically encompass de jure discriminatory measures distinguishing among services
and service suppliers of different origin. Thus, different treatment of services and
service suppliers of non-cooperative jurisdictions in terms of tax purposes was
regarded as too generic a category to benefit from the presumption.
The AB argued that the Panel failed to discuss the possibility that access to tax
information is a decisive relevant factor that impacts on the competitive relation-
ship between services and service suppliers of cooperative and non-cooperative
23 AB Report, Argentina–Financial Services, paras 6.36ff.
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countries. This was a crucial claim by Argentina. The AB held that the Panel should
have evaluated the arguments and evidence brought forward by Argentina showing
how access to tax information affects the competitive relationship, in particular the
choices made by consumers.24
Based on these considerations, the AB reversed the Panel’s threshold finding that
services and service suppliers of non-cooperative countries are like services and
service suppliers of cooperative countries. Because this finding was critical for the
Panel’s findings on bothMFN and NT, the AB found that the Panel erred in its like-
ness analysis for both MFN and NT under the GATS. The AB concluded its ana-
lysis on likeness by underlining that it takes no view as to whether services and
service suppliers of non-cooperative countries are like services and service suppliers
of cooperative countries or those originating in Argentina.
5.2 Less favourable treatment
The AB could have ended its analysis here, as all other Panel’s findings were based
on the finding relating to likeness and thus became moot and of no legal effect.
Instead, the AB decided to continue its analysis and review the other findings
made by the Panel.25 While this was a welcome development in view of the fact
that GATS disputes are a rarity, it is questionable whether the AB had the necessary
authority to do so, as no request for completing the analysis was made by the
parties to the dispute.
Following the logic of its analysis under likeness, the AB discussed the LFT stand-
ard enshrined in MFN and NT together. The AB confirmed that the role of the LFT
standard under both provisions is to ensure equality of competitive opportunities in
the marketplace, and thus involves assessing whether the measure at issue modifies
the conditions of competition without any additional inquiry into the regulatory
objectives or concerns underlying the measure at hand.26 The AB concluded that
non-exchange of tax information does not affect the determination of less favour-
able treatment, thereby reversing the Panel’s previous finding in this regard. In the
view of the AB, such regulatory aspects of concerns that could potentially justify
discriminatory measures are more appropriately addressed by the GATS general
exceptions provision.27 At the same time, the AB did not exclude the possibility
of taking into account evidence relating to regulatory aspects, as long as they
have a bearing on the conditions of competition.
24 For instance, Argentina had argued that when tax havens enter into tax information exchange agree-
ments, consumers move their business to jurisdictions that have not entered into such agreements. Such
behavioral responses are supported by the econonic literature on this subject. See e.g., Elsayyad and
Konrad (2012).
25 AB Report, Argentina–Financial Services, 6.83–6.84.
26 The relevant case-law is summarized in AB Report, EC–Seals, para. 5.101.
27 AB Report, Argentina–Financial Services, 6.115. We concur with this view.
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5.3 Designed and necessary to secure compliance
The third matter the AB was asked to consider, appealed by Panama, was whether
measures 1–4, 7, and 8 found by the Panel to violate MFN and NT under the GATS
were measures designed and necessary to secure compliance with GATS-consistent
Argentine laws and regulations within the meaning of Article XIV(c) GATS.
Surprisingly, Argentina did not appeal the Panel’s finding that its measures were
not justified by Article XIV(c) because Argentina failed to meet the non-discrimin-
ation requirement of the chapeau of Article XIV.
In discussing the first part of Panama’s appeal, the AB referred to the by now
well-established case law on measures to secure compliance under Article XX(d)
GATT.28 The AB reiterated that measures can be considered as securing compli-
ance if their design reveals that they do so even if it cannot be guaranteed that
the result aimed will be achieved. In this regard, Panels must assess the content
and expected operation of the measures at issue as well as review their relationship
with the specific rules, obligations, or requirements contained in the GATS-
consistent laws and regulations as put forward by the respondent who bears the
burden of the affirmative defence. Once found that the measure is designed to
secure compliance, the necessity analysis follows based on the ‘weighing and bal-
ancing’ process identified in Korea–Beef by the AB.29 The AB noted that the two
steps of analysis are conceptually distinct but related aspects of the overall
inquiry under Article XIV(c).
Regarding the design of the measures and their effect of securing compliance, the
AB agreed with the Panel that the measures were designed to secure compliance and
noted that this requirement would be met even if there were several inconsistent
measures as long as those measures were used by the respondent to secure compli-
ance with just one GATS-consistent law or regulation. Partial compliance would
most likely also meet the requirements of Article XIV(c) (Cottier et al., 2008).
With respect to the necessity of the measures at issue, the AB criticized the Panel
because it made a collective weighing and balancing exercise for all measures at
issue rather than each one of those measures individually. Furthermore, the AB
took issue with the rather rudimentary analysis of the extent of the contribution
of each one of the measures to the overall objective of protecting the Argentine
tax collection system against the risks posed by competitive tax practices of coun-
tries classified as non-cooperative for tax transparency purposes.
However, the AB ultimately agreed with the Panel’s findings that the Argentine
measures met the standard set by Article XIV(c) GATS. Overall, the AB confirmed
the broad scope of Article XIV(c) and the rather deferential approach to be adopted
28AB Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R,
adopted 24 March 2006, para. 74.
29 AB Report,Korea –Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R,
WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, para. 164.
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by theWTO judiciary when examining the legal requirements of the subparagraphs
of Article XIV, echoing the relevant GATT case law under Article XX. A relevant
issue in this regard would be whether WTO Members can use non-WTO law – in
this case the FATF and/or the Global Forum standards – to justify discrimination or
other measures that deviate fromWTO commitments. Whereas in most cases there
would be a transposition of such standards into the domestic legal order, in the type
of case at hand the matter is more one of comity: cooperation by trading partners.
Unfortunately, this matter was not addressed by the AB – we return to this question
in Section 6.
Additionally, and in line with the overall deference and judicial restraint called
for under the analysis of the subparagraphs of the general exceptions provisions,
it is questionable whether it is really necessary to require a weighing and balancing,
holistic exercise for each one of the measures at issue, in particular when many if
not all of the measures form an inextricable part of an overall regulatory (here
tax evasion control) policy. Finally, it is quite ironic and regrettable from a jurispru-
dential development viewpoint that, in a tax-related dispute, any discussion and
analysis of Article XIV(d) is virtually absent.
5.4 The prudential carve-out
Argentina did not appeal the Panel’s finding that measures 5 (requirements regard-
ing access to reinsurance services) and 6 (requirements conditioning access to the
Argentine capital market) were not covered by paragraph 2(a) of the Financial
Services Annex (prudential carve-out).30 Panama, however, appealed the Panel’s
finding that the prudential carve-out covers all types of measures affecting the
supply of financial services and instead requested the AB to find that only domestic
regulation measures of the type described in Article VI (typically non-discrimin-
atory measures aimed at ensuring the quality of the service at issue) fall within
the scope of the prudential carve-out. In Panama’s view, the prudential carve-out
could encompass inconsistencies with any provision of the GATS on condition
that the prudential measure imposed was a ‘domestic regulation’, as opposed to,
for example, a market access restriction.
The prudential carve-out is a key provision in the Financial Services Annex of the
GATS. The legal discipline, entitled ‘Domestic Regulation’, reads:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Agreement, a Member shall not be
prevented from taking measures for prudential reasons, including for the protec-
tion of investors, depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is
owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the
financial system. Where such measures do not conform with the provisions of the
30 Recall that the AB reversed the Panel’s findings relating to likeness, which means that the Panel’s
findings as to whether measures 5 and 6 are justified under the prudential carve-out are moot.
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Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Member’s commit-
ments or obligations under the Agreement. (Emphasis added)
This is the first dispute in which a WTO member invoked the prudential carve-out.
The disagreement between Argentina and Panama concerned the scope of this
exception. The GATS, like trade agreements in general, has little to say on the sub-
stantive content of prudential rules or the policy rationales behind their enactment.
While WTO Members agreed on the need to insert such an exception into the
Financial Services Annex, discussions about the actual scope of the provision
under the auspices of the Committee on Financial Services have been few
(Marchetti, 2010).
Derogations from any obligation enshrined in the GATS, not just Article VI
GATS, can be justified if the conditions laid down in Paragraph 2 are met.31 The
carve-out covers a potentially broad range of measures affecting the supply of
financial services as long as it can be shown that they are adopted for prudential
purposes. The initial burden of proof under the prudential carve-out lies with the
complaining party, who must adduce evidence of a violation of a substantive
GATS obligation. Once established, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent
to establish the affirmative prudential defence.32
Although the Argentina – Financial Services Panel and much of the literature
consider the carve-out to be an exception (Leroux, 2002; von Bogdandy and
Windsor, 2008; Marchetti, 2010), Cantore (2018) argues that this misconceives
the role of financial sector regulation. The main reason for negotiating the carve-
out in the first place was not great concern that this was an area lending itself to
abuse (discrimination; concession erosion), but rather serious worries by
financial regulators that they might be constrained by a trade agreement in
taking whatever actions they deemed necessary to ensure financial stability. This
line of argument also implies that putting the burden of proof on the respondent
is inappropriate – and very unlikely to be enforceable given the broad regulatory
mandates and autonomy in many jurisdictions of financial sector regulators (e.g.,
Ministries of Finance; central banks).
Regulating authorities have a broad margin of manoeuvre in regulating the
financial sector. Unlike other public policy exceptions enshrined in Article XIV
GATS, all measures taken for prudential reasons are considered necessary.
31 See also WTO, Trade in Services, ‘Guidelines for the Scheduling of Special Commitments under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)’, S/L/92, 28 March 2001, para. 20.
32 See Panel Report, Argentina – Financial Services, para. 7.816 (noting that the parties to the dispute
appear to consider this provision as a prudential exception). See, contra, Cantore (2014, 2018). The AB
avoided any reflection on the issue of the burden of proof under the prudential carve-out. However, in
fn 607, it referred to its report in European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff
Preferences to Developing Countries (EC–Tariff Preferences), WT/DS246/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2004,
whereby the AB ruled that the complaining party had the initial burden of proof to identify which provi-
sions of the Enabling Clause (the ‘exception’ in that dispute) had to be discussed by the respondent, who
however bore the burden of proof of justifying its measures under the exception.
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Members are not limited in any way regarding the prudential measures authorities
may wish to use to protect the safety and soundness of the financial system, the
integrity of financial markets, and the financial interests of investors and consu-
mers. The language of the Annex differs from that in Article XIV GATS in not
requiring that measures be ‘necessary’ to achieve the stated objectives. Nor is
there language that measures not be applied in a manner that amounts to arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised trade restriction. The only constraint
is that measures be taken for prudential reasons and not be used to circumvent
GATS obligations or nullify scheduled commitments.
The analysis of both the Panel and the AB is in line with the discussion above and
offers no grounds to justify the very narrow approach advocated by Panama with
respect to the substantive scope of the prudential carve-out. The AB noted that the
introductory sentence of paragraph 2(a) does not limit its application to a particu-
lar GATS provision but rather creates an exception vis-à-vis any other GATS pro-
vision. In addition, the second sentence provides support to such a broad
interpretation by referring to the scope of the provision as covering measures
which ‘do not conform with the provisions of the Agreement’. It is true that
many prudential measures, notably those relating to the integrity and stability of
the financial system, will be non-discriminatory and aimed at ensuring the
quality of financial services, thereby falling under Article VI GATS. However, dis-
criminatory measures of the type covered by the GATS market access, national
treatment, and MFN provisions (Articles XVI, XVII, and II) could also be taken
for prudential reasons, e.g., to protect domestic depositors or investors from
fraud, or to prevent money laundering and financing of terrorist organizations.
Nothing precludes the discriminatory application of prudential regulation
measures.
Argentina justified measures 5 and 6 as being prudential in nature. A generous
interpretation of prudential as spanning avoidance of money laundering and terror-
ism would conclude the measures fall under the carve-out. More salient however is
to consider that these measures, as for the other measures, emphasized the tax
regime prevailing in the partner country. These measures were part of the
broader policy set used by Argentina to fight tax evasion by its nationals – and
perhaps also to increase incentives for non-cooperating jurisdictions to
cooperate.33
33 As noted earlier, the AB did not discuss whether measures 5 and 6 were consistent with the pruden-
tial carve-out. The Panel, however, did and found that, while the measures were prudential in nature, they
were not taken for prudential reasons because there was no ‘rational relationship of cause and effect’
between the measures and the prudential reasons identified by Argentina. That was because the measures
would do nothing to encourage Panama’s financial service providers to exchange information once
Panama was considered as a cooperative jurisdiction despite the absence of any information exchange
agreement (or effective exchange of such information). In the Panel’s words, ‘as with measure 5, it is in
the mechanism used by measure 6 for determining who is cooperative and who is not that we see a funda-
mental problem’: Panel Report, Argentina–Financial Services, para. 7.943.
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More generally, it would be rather convoluted to have to invoke the prudential
carve-out to take measures that have been agreed internationally pertaining to the
transfer of illicit funds obtained from illegal trade in drugs, slavery or the financing
of terrorism. As discussed below, a more straightforward approach would be to
invoke Art. XIV to justify such regulatory measures and to clarify that the non-
discrimination rule is not inconsistent with measures that use international stan-
dards to determine which jurisdictions they apply to. On the other hand, taking
into account the absence of a necessity test and the implicit call for judicial restraint
embedded in paragraph 2, one cannot deny the appeal of invoking the prudential
carve-out in such circumstances.
6. Broader policy considerations and alternative approaches
To recap, the issue at hand is an effort by Argentina to combat tax evasion by its
citizens. It is not a case that is about protection of domestic service suppliers.
The problem is offshore jurisdictions that do not share information on financial
holdings and operations of Argentine nationals. In order to reduce the incentives
of its nationals to evade taxes, Argentina distinguished between cooperating and
non-cooperating countries and imputed and collected higher taxes on transactions
and flows between Argentina and non-cooperators. From an economic (indeed,
common sense) perspective, the approach taken by Argentina is sensible: as a
small country with limited market power, there is not much that Argentina by
itself can do to change the behaviour of offshore financial centres.
In a situation where (some) countries play non-cooperatively (i.e., sovereignty
rules), abstracting for the moment from WTO commitments and disciplines,
Argentina does the best it can, given what Panama and other non-cooperating
countries do. Conversely, Panama will determine its optimal strategy in light of
what other financial centres do and what other high tax countries do. Imposing
high penalties on suspect transactions – ideally, such that the expected return
from attempts at evasion becomes smaller than simply paying taxes due and report-
ing financial assets held abroad – is a rational strategy.
Economic models of international ‘tax games’ suggest that some dimensions
of the Argentine measures are what economic analysis suggest is called for in the
prevailing situation, notably a high (penalty) tax on flows to non-cooperating coun-
tries. The economic literature has identified a potential trade-off between beneficial
international economic integration and actions to protect against tax havens that
results in too little action against tax havens (Johannesen, 2012). Argentina’s con-
strained access to international capital markets and scarcity of foreign exchange
attenuate such trade-offs and provide further support for the measures from an eco-
nomic perspective.
This takes as given the policy objectives of the Argentine government and the
prevailing highly distorted incentive framework. In practice, there are many alter-
native policy sets that could mobilize greater tax revenues and higher rates of tax
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collection – including, for example, changes in tax bases, tax levels, improving gov-
ernance, and reducing public corruption. Clearly, Argentine policy could be doing a
better job at promoting national welfare (aggregate real income; growth). This
raises the possibility that the existence of tax havens could be a ‘force for good’
in helping to induce the government to take actions to improve economic govern-
ance and domestic policies.34 Of course, such considerations are not pertinent to
the WTO dispute.
Assuming for purposes of discussion that Argentine policy is justifiable on eco-
nomic grounds, the main question is whether the WTO constrains Argentina’s
ability to impose penalty measures on its citizens that transact with non-cooperat-
ing offshore centres to combat tax evasion. Clearly, this is detrimental to the off-
shore financial centres. But equally clearly, the policy is not designed and does
not have the effect of benefitting domestic service suppliers. A tax compliant
citizen can do business with cooperating offshore centres and there are many of
those. The measures target taxpayers and seek to enforce domestic regulation
and law to Argentine nationals. The problem was that Argentina could not demon-
strate in a compelling and unambiguous fashion that it did not discriminate in its
treatment of cooperative as opposed to non-cooperative jurisdictions, affording
some non-cooperative ones effective cooperative treatment. This was an unneces-
sary own goal. If it had implemented its decree consistently in distinguishing
between cooperative and non-cooperative jurisdictions, the Art. XIV defence pre-
sumably would have been effective.
The services that were targeted are ‘plain vanilla’ financial instruments and pay-
ments and income associated with them: interests, dividends, profits, capital gains,
equity capital, lending, and underwriting risks. In this regard, the services from dif-
ferent foreign jurisdictions are clearly ‘like’: what country A suppliers offer will be
very close to that of country B suppliers – the offshore financial services markets are
competitive. The difference of course is that from the perspective of an Argentine
tax evader, a jurisdiction with strong secrecy rules will not be a close substitute
for an offshore centre that shares information on account holders with Argentine
tax authorities.
This brings us to the question of ‘likeness’. Are services from non-cooperative
jurisdictions unlike those of cooperative ones because of the absence of cooper-
ation? Again, from the perspective of an Argentine tax evader, the answer is
clear. But this is not because of anything specific as regards the substance of the
financial products involved. Nor is it because regulatory regimes and tax rates
differ across countries. What was at issue was an absence of comity and cooper-
ation between governments. Argentina was requesting other governments to help
34 See, e.g., Johannesen (2010) for an anlysis of alternative dynamics in tax regimes and revenue
collections in a world with tax havens. Slemrod and Wilson (2009) show elimination of havens benefits
non-havens, but that a key focus of policy should be on dealing with the largest havens. Tax havens can
have positive effects on neighbouring non-tax havens (Desai et al., 2006).
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it to enforce its tax laws. In Argentina–Financial Services, the AB missed an oppor-
tunity to clarify these matters.
The intangible and often non-storable nature of services, the resulting need to
consider four different modes of supply and the fact that GATS concessions are
for the most part regulatory commitments clarifying how services trade is to be con-
ducted and regulated (including supplier-related characteristics) are essential fea-
tures that should discourage any automatic transposition of the GATT case-law
relating to likeness to GATS disputes. Instead, in our view these characteristics
call for a narrow test, as the WTO judiciary should avoid second-guessing national
regulatory preferences – a point on which the AB clearly agrees based on its case
law (Howse, 2016).
The very nature of services reduces the value of criteria such as physical charac-
teristics or product classification. The former can at best only be applied when
examining the characteristics of service suppliers. The low level of disaggregation
of services statistics (the UN Central Product Classification) prohibits the detailed
type of examination of products that is possible under the Harmonized System for
goods. Thus, end-uses and consumer preferences are the most relevant criteria for
assessing the likeness of services and service suppliers (Mattoo, 1997).
In our view, as a rule of thumb, regulatory concerns such as access to tax infor-
mation (or lack thereof) and combatting tax evasion should not play a role in deter-
mining likeness but be assessed under the general exceptions provision of Article
XIV. In the case at hand, unlike the AB, we would agree with the Panel’s ultimate
finding of likeness. However, rather than misinterpreting the presumption
approach regarding likeness, the Panel’s analysis should have focused on end-
uses and consumer preferences. It is an open question what the result of such an
approach would have been.
As noted above, from a narrow perspective that focuses on the technical dimen-
sions of the financial services concerned, similar consumer needs (investments, etc.)
are satisfied. The service suppliers describe their business in very similar terms and
compete with each other in the same business sector.35 Clearly, consumer prefer-
ences towards tax evasion will differ, but a refusal by an offshore centre to cooper-
ate with other jurisdictions for tax purposes is exogenous to the services and the
service suppliers in question, as are the concerns and goals of the regulating
State. An assessment of likeness should not encompass these considerations.
Going further and considering the effects of regulatory regimes per se would
make matters even worse, opening the door to governments to define for themselves
what aspects of foreign policies they deem to influence the ‘substance’ of a specific
service product or supplier. This is a slippery slope.
In this respect, we disagree with the AB’s finding that factors that affect the com-
petitive relationship such as effective access to tax information should be discussed
35Cf. Panel Report, China–Electronic Payment Services, para. 7.702.
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under likeness insofar as such factors do not relate strictly to the services or service
suppliers in question. Any attempt to identify overly detailed supplier-related cri-
teria such as the legal form, the skills and certifications or the commercial charac-
teristics of the service supplier would lead to a situation whereby no set of two
service suppliers could ever be deemed like.36 It would be more consistent with
the overall logic of the GATS and more efficient from an economic viewpoint if
regulatory concerns of the type at issue in this dispute were to be considered
under Article XIV GATS, leaving consideration of likeness to cases where the
matter at hand concerns actions that change the competitive landscape in a
manner so as to afford protection to domestic services and service suppliers. This
suggestion applies even more to cases relating to taxes, as Article XIV specifically
refers to justifying measures aimed at the equitable imposition of taxes (Cottier
et al., 2008).
Another option could be to discuss regulatory concerns after the likeness test,
under the LFT analysis. Note that, unlike the GATT, the GATS explicitly incorpo-
rates the LFT standard in both MFN and NT. In such a case, no less favourable
treatment of like services and service suppliers would occur if it does not modify
the conditions of competition in favour of certain foreign services or service suppli-
ers (with respect to MFN) or in favour of domestic services and service suppliers
(NT). A problem with this option is that taking into account regulatory concerns
in order to discriminate will modify the conditions of competition and thus fail
to meet the proviso of Articles II and XVII GATS. In addition, it may lead to
absurd results whereby a violation ofMFN is found but no violation of NT is estab-
lished, as in the Argentina–Financial Services Panel Report.
All this suggests that a narrow likeness test and by implication a narrow LFT
standard, coupled with a discussion of regulatory concerns under Article XIV,
might support greater convergence around the concept of competitive relationship
under the GATS. This does not imply an excessive burden on the respondent or a
re-balancing of rights and obligations under the DSU. Even in the approach ultim-
ately adopted by the AB in this dispute, under the substantive obligation of Articles
II and XVII GATS the respondent would still need to rebut based on regulatory
concerns. In any event, requesting this type of input from the regulating State
makes sense as the respondent, more than anyone participating in the dispute,
has the necessary information to motivate its regulatory concerns and objectives.
The foregoing discussion assumes a situation where there is no international
cooperation on the regulatory matter at issue. It presumes a government unilat-
erally decides the criteria it will use to decide which countries are cooperative.
This is clearly problematical, both because the criteria used may be inappropriate
or inefficient, and because of the extraterritorial dimension and unilateral nature of
the process. While such concerns are limited in the case at hand, as the target of the
36 See the Argentine proposal in AB Report, Argentina–Financial Services, fn. 221.
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measures were nationals of the respondent state and the issue was not the substance
of foreign countries’ regulatory and tax regimes but (lack of) exchange of informa-
tion, there are nonetheless significant issues relating to privacy, data security, due
process, and human rights, to name just a few with a unilateral determination of
what constitutes cooperation. The international effort to define good practices in
sharing of financial information and associated standards are a possible means
of addressing this problem.
Standards resulting from international cooperation and agreements regarding
good regulatory practices require underlying processes that are inclusive and trans-
parent in order to be legitimate. The extent to which this was the case with the
Global Forum process is somewhat of an open question – the fact that most tax
havens participated may have more to do with concerns about the outside
option or threat point than a reflection of their true preferences (Hakelberg,
2016). Whatever the case may be, the extant international standards, the mutual
peer review process, and certification of jurisdictions provide a much stronger
basis for differentiating between countries than does a unilateral determination.
In our view, the existence of relevant international standards that have been
adopted by a critical mass of nations could serve as the basis for legitimate discrim-
ination against non-compliant (non-cooperative) countries.
The GATS does not have the equivalent of a Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
agreement with its presumption that use of international standards implies WTO
consistency of the measure. Hoekman and Mavroidis (2016) argue that the
absence of TBT type norms in the GATS is due in part to a dominance of market
access concerns and differences in view regarding the application of a ‘necessity
test’ under GATS Art. VI:4 but also to a relative absence of international standard-
ization of services, reducing the utility of a TBT-like reliance on international stan-
dards as a way of satisfying the national treatment principle. The case at hand
illustrates that there may be value in greater effort by the WTO Membership to
utilize international standards where these emerge. A clear signal by the AB that
this will be considered in cases where a WTO invokes Art. XIV to take action to
achieve legitimate domestic regulatory objectives could increase incentives to par-
ticipate in such international cooperation. More generally, explicit adoption of
international standards by WTO members into their GATS schedules of commit-
ments, using GATS Art. XVIII (‘additional commitments’) could help move the
GATS incrementally towards the GATT acquis.
7. Conclusion
Argentina–Financial Services raises numerous interesting issues. To some extent,
the case is sui generis as there were strong incentives for Argentine citizens to get
their money out of the country given the macroeconomic environment, absence
of growth prospects, populist politics, and endemic corruption. From an economic
perspective, any solution to the Argentine problems in collecting tax revenue
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extends well beyond the measures involved in the dispute – it must encompass far-
reaching improvements in governance to re-establish trust in the public sector and
structural reforms to improve the investment climate and reduce the extent to
which incentives are distorted. Weaknesses in governance and public administra-
tion may have played a direct role in the case at hand – reflected in the inability
of the government to distinguish in a consistent manner between different offshore
financial centres, its treatment of cooperative as opposed to non-cooperative juris-
dictions, and the non-appeal of the Panel finding regarding its Art. XIV defence.
Argentina did itself no service in the way it implemented its measures and defended
itself.
Abstracting from these country-specific idiosyncrasies, the dispute raises issues
that are important for the trading system. We have argued that the AB missed an
important opportunity in this case – although this is in part a function of the
non-appeal by Argentina of the Panel finding regarding its Art. XIV defence. We
will not repeat ourselves here but conclude with a general remark. This case illus-
trates a basic tension in trade agreements, not limited to the GATS, in dealing with
regulation. Trade agreements and trade negotiators are focused on market access,
not on achieving regulatory objectives more efficiently or in supporting regulatory
cooperation. This market access mind set influences the approach that is taken
towards efforts to discipline the use of measures that may restrict trade in services
but are necessary to achieve domestic regulatory objectives – including in this case
enforcement of national legislation that applies to national persons only. The appli-
cation of a GATT-inspired ‘likeness’ framework in cases that centre on the enforce-
ment of domestic regulation, and the willingness to consider arguments that
regulation – which inherently plays a significant role in the operation of many ser-
vices markets – may influence determinations of whether services are like illustrates
the problem.
How to deal with the trade effects of domestic regulatory measures is nothing
new. The challenge of balancing trade vs. regulatory goals will only become
more salient as WTO Members become more services-intensive economies over
time. In the specific dispute considered in this article, the matter was rather straight-
forward and further facilitated by the existence of international standards that per-
mitted an objective delineation to be made between countries on the basis of
whether they had been certified as being in compliance with the standards. It is
unfortunate that the opportunity was not taken to use this dispute to begin to
develop a conceptual framework that can help guide WTO Members in dealing
with the tensions that may arise between trade integration and domestic regulation.
References
Bergman,M. (2009),Tax Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America: The Political Culture of Cheating
and Compliance in Argentina and Chile, University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.
288 P A N A G I O T I S D E L I M A T S I S A N D B E R N A R D H O E K M A N
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745617000635
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universiteit van Tilburg / Tilburg University, on 30 Oct 2020 at 13:32:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
Cantore, C. (2014), ‘‘Shelter from the Storm’: Exploring the Scope of Application and Legal Function of the
GATS Prudential Carve-Out’, Journal of World Trade, 48(6): 1223–1246.
——– (2018), The Prudential Carve-Out for Financial Services: Rationale and Practice in the GATS and
Preferential Trade Agreements, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cottier, T., P. Delimatsis, and N. Diebold (2008), ‘Article XIV GATS – General Exceptions’, in
R. Wolfrum, P.-T. Stoll, and C. Feinäugle (eds.), Max–Planck Commentaries on World Trade
Law, Vol. 6: WTO-Trade in Services, Leiden, Netherlands: Brill/Nijhoff, pp. 287–328.
Delimatsis, P. (2007), International Trade in Services and Domestic Regulations –Necessity, Transparency
and Regulatory Diversity, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Desai, M., C. Fritz Foley, and J. Hines (2006), ‘Do Tax Havens Divert Economic Activity?’, Economics
Letters, 90: 219–224.
Elsayyad, M. and K. Konrad (2012), ‘Fighting Multiple Tax Havens’, Journal of International Economics,
86(2): 295–305.
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (2012), ‘International Standards on Combating Money Laundering
and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation’, updated October 2016, FATF, Paris, www.
fatf-gafi.org/recommendations.html.
Freis, J. (2010), ‘The G-20 Emphasis on Promoting Integrity in Financial Markets’, in M. Giovanoli and
D. Devos (eds.), International Monetary and Financial Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Garcia-Bernardo, J., J. Fichtner, F. Takes, and E. Heemskerk (2017), ‘Uncovering Offshore Financial
Centers: Conduits and Sinks in the Global Corporate Ownership Network’, University of
Amsterdam, mimeo.
Gómez-Sabaini, J. and J. Jiménez (2012), ‘Tax Structure and Tax Evasion in Latin America’, CEPAL (Serie
Macroeconomia del Desarrollo no. 118).
Hakelberg, L. (2016), ‘Coercion in International Tax Cooperation: Identifying the Prerequisites for
Sanction Threats by a Great Power’, Review of International Political Economy, 23(3): 511–541.
Hoekman, B. and P. C. Mavroidis (2016), ‘A Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement for Services?,’ in
P. Sauvé and M. Roy (eds.), Research Handbook on Trade in Services, EUI RSCAS Working
Paper 2015/25, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Hoekman, B. and N. Meagher (2014), ‘China–Electronic Payment Services: Discrimination, Economic
Development and the GATS’, World Trade Review, 13(2): 409–442.
Howse, R. (2016), ‘The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary’,
European Journal of International Law, 27(1): 9–77.
Hudec, R. (2000), ‘“Like Product”: The Differences In Meaning in GATT Articles I and III’, in T. Cottier
and P. C. Mavroidis (eds.), Regulatory Barriers and the Principle of non-discrimination in world
trade law, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, pp. 101–123.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2016), Argentina: Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 16/347,
Washington, DC: IMF.
Johannesen, N. (2010), ‘Imperfect Tax Competition for Profits, Asymmetric Equilibrium and Beneficial
Tax Havens’, Journal of International Economics, 81: 253–264.
——– (2012), ‘Optimal Fiscal Barriers to International Economic Integration in the Presence of Tax
Havens’, Journal of Public Economics, 96: 400–416.
Leroux, E. (2002), ‘Trade in Financial Services under the World Trade Organization’, Journal of World
Trade, 36(3): 413–442.
Marchetti, J. (2010), ‘Making Sense of the GATS Prudential Carve-out for Financial Services (in Turbulent
Times)’, in P. Delimatsis and N. Herger (eds.), Financial Regulation at the Crossroads: Implications
for Supervision, Institutional Design and Trade, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International.
Mattoo, A. (1997), ‘National Treatment in the GATS: Corner-Stone or Pandora’s Box?’, Journal of World
Trade, 31: 107–135.
Mavroidis, P. C. (2016), The Regulation of International Trade, Volume 1: GATT, Boston, MA: MIT
Press.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1998), Harmful Tax Competition:
An Emerging Global Issue, Paris: OECD.
National Tax Regulation, Voluntary International Standards, and the GATS 289
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745617000635
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universiteit van Tilburg / Tilburg University, on 30 Oct 2020 at 13:32:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
——– (2000), Towards Global Tax Cooperation: Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax
Practices, Paris: OECD.
——– (2009), Decision of the Council Establishing the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of
Information for Tax Purposes, C(2009)122/FINAL, Paris: OECD.
——– (2016), ‘Exchange of Information on Request – Handbook for Peer Reviews 2016-2020’, 3rd edn,
Global Forum On Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, Paris: OECD.
Slemrod, J. and J. Wilson (2009), ‘Tax Competition with Parasitic Tax Havens’, Journal of Public
Economics, 93: 1261–1270.
United States Trade Representative (USTR) (2013), 2013 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign
Trade Barriers, Washington DC: USTR.
Von Bogdandy, A. and J. Windsor (2008), ‘Annex on Financial Services’, in R.Wolfrum, P.-T. Stoll, and C.
Feinäugle (eds.),Max-Planck Commentaries onWorld Trade Law, Vol. 6: WTO-Trade in Services,
Leiden, Netherlands: Brill/Nijhoff, pp. 618–639.
290 P A N A G I O T I S D E L I M A T S I S A N D B E R N A R D H O E K M A N
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745617000635
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universiteit van Tilburg / Tilburg University, on 30 Oct 2020 at 13:32:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
